The complexity that has just been mentioned could be completely dismissed by calling into question the existence of a simple passive legal entity as a whole: why not simply identify the legal entity in the administrators of a legal platform? This would perhaps bring us one step closer to a representation of the legal person independent of value, since the orientation and scope of action can be defined almost independently of value.42 However, such a demarcation would reduce the explanatory power of a theory, since it would essentially exclude young children, senile persons, etc. legal personality; Such a theory should argue that U.S. legislative changes that claim to treat fetuses as legal entities (generally in the context of extending criminal law protection to unborn children) and the goals of the Nonhuman Human Rights Project are conceptually wrong. Finally, the latter project aims to give certain non-human animals a legal status partly similar to that of human minors. Lawyers who – implicitly or explicitly – recognise the legal personality of children could, of course, simply be confused. However, there are good reasons for this branch between passive legal personality and active legal personality, since both aspects work in different ways: passive legal personality is associated with Hohfeld`s claims, while active legal personality is associated with acts. To disregard one or other aspect of the legal person would be to ignore important features of the concept. The term “legal person” is often used in the field of business law. —Acknowledgements.— The author thanks Krzysztof Posłajko, Tomasz Gizbert-Studnicki, Bartosz Biskup and Wojciech Graboń for their comments and the two anonymous critics for their insightful suggestions and careful reading of the first version of the manuscript. This article is part of a research project funded by the National Science Centre of Poland (No. 2020/36/C/HS5/00600) (analysis of the concept of legal entity from an ontological and linguistic point of view).
This work was also supported by the (Polish) National Agency for Academic Exchanges (funding code). PPI/APM/2018/1/00022 In law, a corporation is any person or “thing” (less ambiguous, any legal entity) that can do the things that an ordinary person can normally do under the law – such as entering into contracts, suing and being sued, owning property, etc.    The reason for the term “legal person” is that some legal persons are not persons: corporations and corporations are legally “persons” (they can legally do most of the things an ordinary person can do), but they are clearly not people in the ordinary sense. I noted earlier that in the literature, the term “legal entity” is used (at least) in two different ways: some use it to refer to a set of legal positions, others a non-legal entity that meets certain criteria. Note: This page contains one or more references to the Internal Revenue Code (IRC), Treasury Regulations, court proceedings, or other official tax guidelines. References to these legal authorities are for the convenience of those who wish to read the technical reference material. To access applicable IRC sections, Treasury regulations or other official tax policies, visit the Tax Code, Regulations and Official Guidelines page. To access all Tax Court decisions issued after September 24, 1995, visit the U.S. Tax Court`s opinion research page. There are some possible objections to the proposed relatively extensive scope of jurisdiction. A critic might argue that a full understanding of the legal consequences of a transaction by the parties involved is necessary for the transaction to be considered a legal act.
Only sane adults can supposedly possess such an understanding. However, such a requirement would be far too strong; Very often, it is not true that an adult with common sense is aware of all the legal implications of the action he will perform. For example, the legal consequences of marriage are usually very extensive. In the television series The Sopranos, a character decides to marry a mobster in order to claim the privilege of the spouse, so as not to testify against him. However, she misunderstands the rules of privilege that do not apply to the couple. Does this mean that she did not perform a legal act when she married? Completely unnecessary is a definition of legal acts according to which only experienced family law lawyers actually perform legal acts at marriage. On the contrary, the threshold value must be set much lower. Legal acts presuppose that an attempt can be made to obtain a legal consequence. Such an intention requires some understanding of institutional reality and how to manipulate that reality with the help of symbols. For example, in the case of a legal contract, it must be understood that one agrees to perform or refrain from performing an action, and that one will face certain legal consequences if one does not respect one`s agreement. Article 19, paragraph 3, of the Basic Law provides: “Fundamental rights shall also apply to national natural persons to the extent permitted by the nature of those rights.  A legal or artificial person (Latin: persona ficta; also a legal person) has a legal name and has certain rights, property rights, privileges, responsibilities and responsibilities in the law, similar to those of a natural person.
The concept of legal entity is a fundamental legal fiction. It is relevant to the philosophy of law because it is essential for laws that affect a company (company law). O`Donnell, E. L., Talbot-Jones, J. (2018). Creating Legal Rights for Rivers: Lessons from Australia, New Zealand and India. Ecology and Society, 23(1), 7. Eligibility rights include the directness of obligations; they are held by beings to whom duties are due. Most people would probably agree that homework can be due to children, but animals are already a slightly more controversial case.
What about rocks, idols, rivers or atoms? There may very well be legal entities dedicated to the preservation of a river, but how can we determine whether they have fiduciary duties to the river – and therefore essentially represent the river and not, for example, the interests of the public? I discussed these issues in Chapter 2 and I do not intend to repeat that discussion here, but I will address some relevant points. First, according to Kramer`s theory of interests – which, although not accepted as a theory of rights, is the best theory of Hohfeld`s claims – sentient beings are the main group of claimants. We may have duties to adults, children and non-human animals, but not, for example, to rivers. Our duties may rather concern rivers. This distinction is based on a moral distinction: sentient beings have ultimate value, and waters are not.